We consider a dynamic Bertrand game, in which prices are publicly observed and each rm receives a privately observed cost shock in each period. Although cost shocks are independent across rms, within a rm costs follow a rst-order Markov process. We analyze the set of collusive equilibria available to rms, emphasizing the best collusive scheme for the rms at the start of the game. In general, there is a tradeo between productive e ciency, whereby the low-cost rm serves the market in a given period, and high prices.
Introduction
A rich literature analyzes the problem of collusion in repeated games. In one important class of models, the price or output decisions of individual rms are imperfectly observed by other rms. Green and Porter (1982) and Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti (1986) analyze the case where individual rm output decisions are not observed; instead, a noisy signal (the market price) of the rms' output decisions is publicly observed. Imperfect observability of actions is an important concern in some settings, as when the product is an intermediate input and the customers are rms who negotiate prices individually. In other settings, however, the relevant rm behavior is publicly observed. For example, in a government procurement auction, the bids are usually publicly available; and many consumer goods are sold at publicly posted prices.
Even when rm behavior is publicly observed, colluding rms may confront signi cant informational problems. Firms' production costs often have important components that are private information, due to variations in supply contracts and process innovations. In an ideal collusive scheme, rms would communicate truthfully about their respective costs, so that, at each point in time, they could both maintain high prices and assign all production to the rm(s) with the lowest production costs. Such a scheme is possible, however, only if rms have incentives to communicate truthfully and accept the corresponding market-share assignments.
This discussion motivates consideration of a di erent class of collusion models, in which rms are privately informed as to their cost types and take actions that are publicly observed. Aoyagi (2003) , Athey and Bagwell (2001) , Athey, Bagwell and Sanchirico (2004) and Skryzpacz and Hopenhayn (2004) develop models of this kind, where rms play a repeated Bertrand pricing game, or equivalently, act as bidders in a series of procurement auctions. Importantly, these papers focus on the case where cost types are independent over time. This assumption is not always plausible. In some procurement auction settings, for example, individual rms may enjoy persistent sources of cost advantage. Similarly, for a rm selling products in a market, there are often many components of cost. Over time, di erent parts of the production process may see improvement, or the rm may sign new contracts for inputs, where the contracts may last several periods. Although rms may have a general understanding of the overall cost structure of their competitors, they may lack speci c knowledge of the factors that change over time and a ect competitor costs. 1 In this paper, we study collusion among rms that are privately informed as to their respective cost types, where cost shocks are persistent over time. The case of perfect persistence is a special case of our analysis. 2 Formally, we model rms as interacting over an in nite horizon in a dynamic game of Bertrand competition, where in any period each rm privately observes its cost shock before publicly selecting its price. So as to allow the greatest possible scope for collusion, we assume that colluding rms can communicate before setting their prices; this allows us to analyze the extent to which communication is useful for colluding rms, an important question for antitrust policy. We assume as well that rms can allocate market share unequally among themselves, so long as they charge the same price. Although cost shocks are independent across rms, within a rm costs follow a rst-order Markov process. 3 Under the assumption that demand is inelastic, we analyze the set of collusive equilibria available to rms, emphasizing the best collusive scheme for the rms at the start of the game. Given that cost types are private information and persistent, our game is not a repeated game but rather a dynamic game with hidden state variables. We are interested in what we call Perfect Public Bayesian Equilibria (PPBE) of this game. This is a re nement of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, and it is the natural extension of the Perfect Public Equilibrium (PPE) (Fudenberg, Levine, and Maskin, 1994) solution concept for the dynamic Bayesian game that we study. 4 Relatively little prior work has analyzed dynamic games where players have (perfectly or imperfectly) persistent private information, and thus we believe that the techniques developed here may be useful in other contexts as well. 5 Whether costs shocks are persistent or not, rms face important incentive constraints when attempting to achieve productive e ciency, whereby the lowest-cost rm serves the market in each period. Productive e ciency requires that lower-cost rms expect higher market share, and this creates a temptation for higher-cost rms to mimic lower-cost rms. Such mimicry can be dissuaded if a rm expects that, following a period where it reports lower costs, it will equilibria. LaCasse (2001) studies the case of perfect substitutes and downward-sloping demand, with two cost types; Chakrabarti (2001) analyzes Cournot oligopoly with discrete types.
3 When types are correlated across rms, collusion may be easier. First, the loss associated with failing to allocate production to the lowest-cost rm is smaller, since rm costs are typically similar. Second, it is less costly to provide incentives, since a rm may be punished for reported cost types that di er from those of its competitors. See Aoyagi (2003) for discussion of collusion when types are correlated across players.
4 Cole and Kocherlakota (2001) develop an analogous concept for dynamic games with hidden actions and hidden state variables; they refer to their concept as Markov-Private Perfect Equilibrium. 5 For example, the folk theorem of Fudenberg, Levine, and Maskin (1994) does not apply to dynamic games with persistent private information. Persistent private information has received attention in other contexts. The early studies of reputation formation (Kreps and Wilson, 1982; Milgrom and Roberts, 1982) analyze nitehorizon dynamic games in which there is a small probability that a player is a perfectly persistent and irrational type. Recently, Abreu and Gul (2000) and Abreu and Pearce (2003) extend and apply this approach to dynamic bargaining games. Our work di ers in that all types are rational, occur with substantial probability, and may change over time; further, we focus on cooperative equilibria, and revelation of types in each period is necessary for e ciency. Kennan (2001) analyzes a dynamic bargaining game between a buyer and a seller, in which the buyer's private information may change over time and follows a two-state Markov process. Our work di ers in that it allows for all agents to have private information; furthermore, we focus on cooperative equilibria. Watson (2002) examines the role of perfectly persistent private information in a model of dynamic relationship formation wherein the stakes of the relationship evolve over time. In the dynamic contracting literature, La ont and Tirole (1988) highlight a ratchet e ect, when the agent's type is perfectly persistent and only short-term contracts are feasible. Fernandez and Phelan (2000) numerically analyze a dynamic principal-agent problem where the agent's type follows a Markov process; and Battaglini (2005) studies long-term contracts that induce separation in similar settings. We discuss the dynamic contracting literature further in Section 3. receive lower market share or endure lower prices. For the cartel, the bene t of productive e ciency in the current period thus must be balanced against the costs of possibly ine cient production and/or low prices in future periods. Future productive ine ciency would arise, if future market share were withheld from a rm that continues to enjoy low costs.
At an intuitive level, it is not immediately clear whether collusion becomes easier or harder when cost types are correlated over time. On the one hand, when cost types are persistent, it becomes possible for a rm to make inferences about rival's costs, using past price observations. Accordingly, one might expect that persistence would give rms more instruments with which to reveal information and assign production e ciently. On the other hand, persistence creates a new incentive to mimic another cost type, since mimicry today in uences rival's beliefs in the future. Indeed, when cost types exhibit persistence, repeated play of the equilibrium of a one-shot game is no longer an equilibrium in the dynamic game, and so simply constructing any equilibrium (let alone the best or worst) is non-trivial.
We begin our formal analysis by constructing the best pooling equilibrium. In pooling equilibria, strategies do not depend on rms' past or present cost types. These equilibria are appealing given the considerations just described, since there is no incentive to manipulate opponent beliefs. In the best pooling equilibrium, rms share the market equally at the customer's reservation price in every period. Firms thus achieve high prices but no productive e ciency.
In the case of a deviation, they switch to a \punishment" pooling equilibrium that takes a \carrot-stick" form: rms start the punishment by sharing the market at a low price and after each period switch with some probability to an equilibrium where all rms share the market at the reservation price. The best pooling equilibrium exists if rms are su ciently patient.
Under the assumption that the (initial) distribution of costs is log-concave, we next establish that the best pooling equilibrium is actually the best (unconstrained) equilibrium in the limiting case where costs are perfectly persistent, and is close to optimal when costs are close to perfectly persistent. The case with perfectly persistent costs raises some interesting issues. At rst, it might seem that the dynamic game would immediately collapse to a static one when costs do not change over time. But this intuition is incomplete: even though costs do not change, rms can still make di erent choices at di erent points in time. For example, there exist equilibria where rms use an initial signaling phase to reveal cost types, followed by a phase where prices are higher but market shares are allocated according to the early signals. Under the log-concavity assumption, however, the equilibrium that maximizes ex ante cartel payo s is extremely simple, when rms are su ciently patient: all rms share the market at the customer's reserve price. 6 6 Interestingly, the optimal equilibrium is the same as the optimal equilibrium in the model studied by Athey, Bagwell, and Sanchirico (2004) , in which costs are independent over time but rms use Strongly Symmetric Perfect Public Equilibria (SPPE), whereby at the beginning of each period, strategies and expected payo s are symmetric. The SPPE solution concept is appropriate when the winning price, or even the vector of rm prices, is publicly observed, but a rm is not able to identify the individual behavior of any rm other than itself. In contrast, in this paper we do not use the strong symmetry restriction, and in general rms will not view one another symmetrically after the beginning of the game.
In contrast, when the log-concavity assumption is relaxed, we show that equilibria with an initial signaling phase may yield greater pro ts than the best pooling equilibria. Intuitively, equilbria with an initial signaling phase entail a tradeo between the cost of low prices in the signaling phase and the bene t of greater productive e ciency in the future; we provide conditions under which the bene t dominates when log-concavity fails. In such cases, the equilibrium construction must respect the inability of rms to commit to their response to the revelation of information.
We next return to the case of imperfectly persistent costs and establish that some productive e ciency is optimal when rms are su ciently patient. Indeed, if rms are su ciently patient to enforce the best pooling equilibrium, then they can enforce as well a simple \odd-even" equilibrium that achieves partial productive e ciency and yields higher expected pro ts. An odd-even equilibrium employs a simple two-period rotation scheme. In odd periods, rms announce their types, and the low-cost rm gets a high market share. In even periods, if a rm received the high market share in the previous period, it now receives a reduced market share, where the amount of the reduction is chosen to deter mimicry in the previous (odd) period. If costs are independent over time, this scheme would induce some productive e ciency in odd periods, while in even periods the market would be served by an average-cost rm. This scheme is less e ective, however, when costs are close to perfectly persistent, since high-cost rms are then likely to serve the market in even periods.
Given that persistence compromises the e ectiveness of the odd-even scheme, it is natural to ask whether it is possible to attain rst-best collusion. We know that when the serial correlation is equal to zero, the model is equivalent to that of Athey and Bagwell (2001) , who show that rst-best collusion is possible. But it is not immediately clear that rst-best can be attained or approximated in a PPBE once cost types are persistent. With even slight persistence, the game changes in fundamental ways: rms have new incentives to signal and manipulate their opponents' beliefs in ways that may advantage them in the future.
We show that, despite these complications, when the persistence of types is not too high relative to the patience of rms, rst-best collusion is possible. The collusive equilibrium calls for rms to announce their cost types, and rms that have announced low cost in the recent past give up market share in states of the world where the rms have the same cost type. If rms are su ciently patient, they can be induced to wait for such states. We present numerical examples of rst-best collusive schemes. Although these schemes involve subtle incentives, they can be described fairly easily and computed analytically for speci c parameter values.
Taken together, our results indicate that when patience is high relative to the persistence of cost types, the best equilibrium entails productive e ciency, high prices, and market shares that are less positively correlated over time than are the cost types. This type of equilibrium is non-stationary and fairly complex. In contrast, when persistence of cost types is large relative to patience of rms, but rms are still moderately patient, the best equilibrium is very simple: it entails productive ine ciency, high prices, and stable market shares. A variety of empirical evidence and descriptive accounts of collusion establish an association between collusion and rigid prices and stable market shares (Athey, Bagwell and Sanchirico, 2004 ); yet, there are also case studies of collusive schemes that were quite sophisticated and where market share was exchanged intertemporally among co-conspirators (Athey and Bagwell, 2001 ).
Finally, we consider whether equilibria with productive e ciency in every period exist at all (even with low prices) when cost types are very persistent. We show that in the continuum-type case, it is sometimes possible to construct an equilibrium that entails productive e ciency in every period, but any such equilibrium yields per-period pro ts equal to those in the one-shot Nash equilibrium. The equilibrium we construct has above-competitive prices in the rst period but lower prices subsequently. Intuitively, a rm gains when it is perceived to have higher costs, since rivals then price less aggressively in future periods. If rms are too patient, the incentive for a lower-cost type to mimic the price of a higher-cost type in the initial signaling phase is overwhelming, and no equilibrium with productive e ciency exists.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. The next two sections analyze pooling equilibria and separating equilibria, respectively. In Section 5, we consider punishment equilibria that entail productive e ciency. Section 6 concludes.
The Model
In this section, we introduce the model. There are I rms that meet in periods t = 1; ::; 1:
Throughout, we use the following notational conventions. If X i represents a set, then X = (X 1 ; ::; X I ): Given a sequence fx i;t g 1 t=1 ; where x i;t 2 X i ; x t denotes (x 1;t ; ::; x I;t ); x t i denotes (x i;1 ; ::; x i;t ); and x t = (x 1 ; ::; x t ):
We posit I ex ante identical rms that meet in periods t = 1; ::; 1 to engage in Bertrand competition for sales in a homogenous-good market. Firms discount the future at rate 2 (0; 1).
We assume that in each period, demand is inelastic, and there is a unit mass of identical consumers with a xed reservation price r, where r > , with being the highest possible cost for rms. Thus, demand is stationary over time, and consumers are not strategic players. Let p i;t 2 R + denote the price chosen by rm i. Firm i's \cost type" in time t, i;t ; follows a rst-order Markov processes with support
The commonly known distribution function is F ( j i;t 1 ); where i;t 1 is the rm's cost type in period t 1. Let i;1 be drawn from the prior F 0 ( ) (where this prior is the stationary distribution of the Markov process): To avoid the need for special notation, we use the convention that F ( j i;0 ) = F 0 ( ) throughout (even though there may be no such i;0 that returns the prior). To represent vectors of cost types and probability distributions, let
; F ( j I;t 1 )): We emphasize that the cost shocks are not a ected by any actions the rms may take.
We refer to two special cases of this model throughout the paper.
Model De nitions:
Model 1: i = f ; g 2 R 2 ; with < : Both F 0 ( ) and F ( j i;t 1 ) have full support on i for all i;t 1 2 i . We let = L and = H and use the notation for types interchangeably.
We let i;t 1 = F (Lj i;t 1 ). We focus on the case of positive serial correlation, whereby
Model 2: i = [ ; ] R: Cost types are perfectly persistent, so that F ( j i;t 1 ) places all of the probability weight on i;t 1 : F 0 has a strictly positive density over its support.
Thus, Model 1 is a two-type model in which types are imperfectly persistent, whereas Model 2 allows for a continuum of types and focuses on the case of perfect persistence.
Note that if the game ends after period 1, and rms play the Bertrand pricing game described above, the model is equivalent to a one-shot, rst-price procurement auction with posted reservation price r; where types are drawn from distribution F 0 ( ): For both models, the static equilibria when all rms draw types from F 0 ( ) entail productive e ciency and prices that are always weakly less than the highest cost type. 7
Each period t of the dynamic game follows a timeline, in which each rm i : (i) privately observes a new cost shock, i;t 2 i ; (ii) may engage in \cheap talk," whereby it publicly announces its cost type a i;t 2 A i (announcements are simultaneous), where jA i j j i j; (iii) simultaneously selects a price p i;t 2 P i = R + and a maximum quantity it is willing to sell,
, both of which are publicly observed; (iv) receives market share ' i (p t ; q t );
where ' i : P Q ! [0; 1] is an exogenous, stationary rationing rule such that if N (p t ) is the set of rms charging the lowest price, q i;t ' i (p t ; q t ) min(1= jN (p t )j ; q i;t ): Thus, if the quantity restrictions for the low-price rms sum to one, each will get exactly its quantity restriction.
Also, if each low-price rm selects q i;t 1=N (p t ); then each low-price rm receives a market share allocation of 1=N (p t ): If P i2N (pt) q i;t < 1; an analogous rationing rule is used to allocate the residual market share to the set of rms charging the next-lowest price, and so on until the market share is exhausted or there are no rms remaining with non-zero quantity restrictions.
The details of the rationing rule are not important for any of our results.
We pause to provide some additional explanation for the announcements and quantity restrictions. They are included to allow rms to share the market in unequal proportions as a function of rm cost types. An equilibrium might specify that following some history, if two rms both announce low costs and tie for the lowest price, then one rm gets only 1=3 of the market. If that rm deviates from the agreement and takes more than 1/3, the deviation will be observable by opponents. If announcements were eliminated, then quantity restrictions might lead rms to underproduce in some states of the world. However, if the model was modi ed 7 Athey and Bagwell (2001) and Riley and Samuelson (1981) characterize the static equilibria for Models 1 and 2, respectively. When rms can be asymmetric (i.e., have di erent cost distributions), there is typically productive ine ciency in Model 2. characterize the static equilibrium for asymmetric rms for Model 1, while the static equilibrium for Model 2 is characterized by Maskin and Riley (2000) .
so that quantity restrictions came after pricing decisions, prices could take over some of the coordination role of the quantity restrictions. In the absence of both announcements and quantity restrictions, the set of possible rm market shares would be quite limited. Despite this, below we show that in many cases, announcements and quantity restrictions are not necessary to achieve optimal equilibria. In other cases, eliminating these features would lead to reductions in e ciency for some parameter values.
Including them allows us to analyze whether communication is useful, an important question for antitrust policy.
Summarizing, within a period, after announcements, prices, and quantity restrictions are determined as (a t ; p t ; q t ), a rm will receive pro ts (p i;t i;t )' i (p t ; q t ): Notice that announcements do not directly a ect pro ts; they simply in uence the rms' choices of prices and quantity restrictions.
The set of possible \period strategies" in a given period t for rm i is given by S i fs i;t js i;t : A i ! Z i g; where the elements s i;t of S i must be decomposable into three component functions, s i;t = ( i;t ; i;t ; i;t ); satisfying the following restrictions: The announcement function i;t depends only on the rm's own cost type. Since announcements precede pricing and quantity decisions, the latter choices depend on both the rm's own type as well as the announcements of others. In other words, when types are given by t ; rm i rst announces a i;t = i;t ( i;t ): Then each rm i observes a i;t = i;t ( i;t ): Next, each rm i sets price p i;t = i;t (a t ; i;t ) and chooses quantity restriction q i;t = i;t (a t ; i;t ):
Finally, market shares are determined by ' i;t (p t ; q t ):
In this paper, we will occasionally analyze a situation where one rm wishes to undercut another. Selectively, in those cases, we will use the convention that " > 0 is the smallest price increment, so that a rm undercuts by charging " or 2" less than its opponent. However, we will not necessarily include " in any pro t calculations. Thus, when we say that \ rm j charges p i ";" this should be interpreted as saying that rm j charges a negligible amount less than p i ; thereby winning the market at (essentially) price p i :
Interim Pro ts
We now introduce notation for the \interim" payo s for rm i, after rm i knows its cost type in period t but before rm i acts. Let i be a probability distribution over i : Given a function g, we let E i;t [g( i;t )j i ] denote the expectation over values of i;t taking i as the probability distribution over i;t : When i = F ( ; i;t 1 ); we simply write E i;t [g( i;t )j i;t 1 ]:
At the interim stage, for any given period strategy s i;t = ( i;t ; i;t ; i;t ); a rm can deviate from this strategy in several ways. The rm might choose a deviant announcement (a i;t 6 = i;t ( i;t )); it might choose prices and quantity restrictions that are inconsistent with the set of realized announcements or its own type (p i;t 6 = i;t (a t ; i;t ) or q i;t 6 = i;t (a t ; i;t )); or it might do some combination of these things. All of these possible deviations can be represented by an alternative strategys i;t 6 = s i;t .
However, there is one particular type of deviation, termed an \on-schedule deviation," that will play a special role in the analysis. In this type of deviation,s i;t speci es that type i;t \mimics"^ i;t 6 = i;t : that is,~ i;t ( i;t ) = i;t (^ i;t ); and for all a t ;~ i;t (a t ; i;t ) = i;t (a t ;^ i;t ) and i;t (a t ; i;t ) = i;t (a t ;^ i;t ): Although this deviation can be represented directly through the strategys i;t ; it will be more convenient to introduce direct notation for mimicry. Formally, if rm i's beliefs about opponent types at the start of period t are given by i ; then the following expressions represent interim expected market share and expected pro ts for rm i when rm i has type i;t but mimics the behavior that type^ i;t would use given period strategy s i;t :
We emphasize that the notation is redundant (that is, givens i;t as de ned above, i (^ i;t ; i;t ; s t ; i ) = i ( i;t ; i;t ; (s i;t ; s i;t ); i )), and we do not in any way limit the set of possible deviations to these \on-schedule" deviations.
We distinguish on-schedule deviations from \o -schedule" deviations. In an o -schedule deviation, a rm chooses an action or a series of actions that no cost type should have chosen in equilibrium. Since o -schedule deviations are observable and should never happen in equilibrium, they can be severely punished so as to deter the deviation. In contrast, on-schedule deviations are not observable as deviations. Thus, any future punishment associated with mimicking^ i;t must be borne in equilibrium, when type^ i;t actually occurs.
We say that rm i's announcement is uninformative if there exists some constant c i such that i;t ( i;t ) = c i for all i;t : In the case where all rms' announcements are uninformative,
that is, expected pro ts are equal to price minus cost times expected market share. In many of the collusive equilibria we construct, the price will not depend directly on the announcements, as it will be constant at r; then, (2.1) can be used.
Evolution of Beliefs in the Dynamic Game
We now develop notation for the evolution of rms' beliefs using Bayes' rule. Let i be the set of probability distributions over i : The \product structure" of the game implies that rm j's private information about its history of cost types and past deviations does not provide rm j with any relevant information about rm i. We thus impose that the beliefs of each rm j 6 = i about rm i's cost shocks evolve in the same way along the equilibrium path. We can then say that \ rms' beliefs about opponents in period t are given by t ," by which we mean that for each rm j 6 = i; rm j has belief i;t about i;t . Note that i;t may di er from F ( j i;t 1 ); which is the belief that rm i has about i;t at the start of period t: Let p i;t be the posterior belief that rms j 6 = i hold about i;t at the end of period t, after observing z t ; given a conjectured period strategy s i;t and the period's prior belief i;t : We say that z t is compatible with s i;t and i;t if there exists some cost type i;t such that i;t is in the support of i;t and z i;t = s i;t (a t ; i;t ): In this case, the posterior p i;t is determined using Bayes' rule. On the other hand, if z t is not compatible with s i;t and i;t ; then Bayes' rule does not pin down the posterior beliefs p i;t . The posterior belief is then speci ed by the analyst. We letT : i S i Z ! 2 i denote the correspondence that gives the set of possible period t + 1 beliefs about i;t given ( i;t ; s i;t ; z t ): For all z t that are compatible with s i;t and i;t ,T is single-valued. It is the belief that, as a Bayesian (and given its knowledge of the stochastic process for the evolution of costs) rm j should have about rm i at the beginning of period t + 1; given that rm j started period t with belief i;t ; conjectured that rm i used period strategy s i;t ; and observed a compatible vector of public actions z t : Formally,
Consider now ( i;t ; s i;t ; z t ) such that z t is not compatible with s i;t and i;t : Then,
The period t + 1 belief about i;t+1 is then selected from this set, with the particular selection corresponding to the posterior that is speci ed for period t: Note that even though Bayes' rule no longer determines the posterior belief p i;t , the updating rule still places restrictions on beliefs about i;t+1 : For example, if the posterior p i;t places all of the probability weight on i;t = 0 , then i;t+1 = F ( j i;t = 0 ); thus, if F has full support, i;t+1 must have full support as well:
Henceforth, we let T ( i;t ; s i;t ; z t ) 2T ( i;t ; s i;t ; z t ) be a selection fromT (recalling that the selection is pre-determined for z t that is compatible with s i;t and i;t ). Then, we may describe the evolution of beliefs in a simple, recursive form: i;t+1 = T ( i;t ; s i;t ; z t ): We may summarize the updating function for all rms at once as T( t ; s t ; z t ) = (T ( 1;t ; s 1;t ; z t ); :::; T ( I;t ; s I;t ; z t )) :
Consider some examples of the evolution of beliefs about opponents. If s i;t assigns a unique vector of public actions to each type, then rm j can infer perfectly from z t the value of i;t . In that case, i;t+1 ( ) = F i ( j i;t ): On the other hand, if i;t = F 0 ; and s i;t always assigns the same actions z i;t to all cost types, then after z t is observed, i;t+1 = F 0 ; since nothing is learned in period t and F 0 is the stationary distribution of the Markov process.
Extensive-Form Strategies in the Dynamic Game
To analyze this game, we need to specify a solution concept. We will consider Perfect Bayesian Equilibria (PBE) that satisfy a further re nement, namely that player strategies depend on public histories and their own payo -relevant private information, but not otherwise on their history of private information. We refer to the solution concept we impose here as Perfect Public Bayesian Equilibrium (PPBE). As will be clear, PPBE is a natural extension of Perfect Public Equilibrium (PPE) to dynamic Bayesian (rather than repeated) games. Given that rms are ex ante symmetric, we impose the further restriction that rms use ex ante symmetric strategies; that is, strategies are exchangeable as a function of public and private histories. This implies that asymmetries in rm strategies starting in period t arise as a result of asymmetric cost realizations and behavior in the past. This restriction does not a ect the qualitative nature of our results, but it greatly simpli es the exposition.
We begin with some notation. The observable public history in the dynamic game is an in nite sequence of realized reports, prices, and quantity restrictions, h t = fa t ; p t ; q t g. Let H t be the set of possible public histories at date t. In addition to the public history, at the beginning of period t; rm i knows t 1 i , its past history of cost types. We also assume that after every period, rms can observe the realization of some public randomization device and then select continuation equilibria on this basis. To ease the notational burden, we do not introduce explicit notation for the randomization process.
We consider \public strategies," whereby rm i's strategy maps any history with the same h t 1 and the same i;t to the same actions. Firm i's strategy in period t does not depend on the private history t 1 i : It makes sense that rm i would not care about past cost types once it learns its current cost type: past cost types do not in uence its own beliefs (given that types are Markov); and they were not observed by any opponents, so they do not a ect opponent beliefs either. Thus, in our game, when all opponents use public strategies, each rm has a best response that is public. Given the stochastic process for cost types, our de nition of public strategies is the analog of the standard de nition for repeated games. 8 Firm i's strategy in the extensive-form game can be described by a sequence i;t , where i;t : H t 1 ! S i and the dependence of actions on current cost types is incorporated in the period strategies s i;t 2 S i . The full (public and private) history of the game can be described by fh t ; t g 1 t=1 : Given f t ; t g 1 t=1 ; a full path of play, fa t ; p t ; q t ; t g 1 t=1 , is induced. Payo s for rm i at time 1 thus may be written as: current cost shock i; ; where T is a selection fromT , as de ned in Section 2.2:
where, for all t ; s j;t = j;t (h t 1 ) for all j 2 f1; ::; Ig; z j;t = (a j;t ; p j;t ; q j;t ) = s j;t ( t ( t ); j;t ) for all j 2 f1; ::; Ig; and
When taking the expectation in this de nition, the distribution over future actions and cost types is induced by the strategies and current beliefs about cost types. Using this notation, a PPBE is a collection of public strategies f t g 1 t=1 such that i = f i;t g 1 t=1 is weakly optimal at every information set, together with initial beliefs 1 and a belief updating function T 2T that determines rms' beliefs about opponents at each date t so that, for all i; h t 1 ; and z t ;
Formally, for all i; ; h 1 ; and rm i's beliefs about the rms' opponents i; generated through (2.2) by h 1 and f i;t g 1 t=1 ;
It is straightforward to verify that our de nitions imply that a PPBE is a PBE. 9
Pooling Equilibria
This section focuses on pooling equilibria, whereby strategies do not depend on rms' cost shocks. In order to evaluate the e ciency of equilibria, we introduce the concept of \partial productive e ciency." In a given period, if rms sell to the entire unit-mass of consumers, then the rms achieve partial productive e ciency if the expected industry production cost (weighted across rms by market shares) is less than that which would be achieved were instead each rm assigned an equal share of the market. The rms achieve productive e ciency, if the lowest-cost rm (or rms) always receives all market share. We also introduce the notion of a \scheme."
We use this word to refer to a set of strategies with particular properties. This terminology is useful, since particular strategies may or may not represent equilibrium strategies, or may represent equilibrium strategies only for particular parameter values. Given a [name] scheme, we use the term \[name] equilibrium" to refer to a PPBE in which a [name] scheme is used.
Pooling Equilibria Exist when Firms Are Patient
Pooling equilibria may take several forms. In one class of stationary pooling equilibria, along the equilibrium path, the strategies specify that rms always share the market equally at a particular price. We refer to such strategies as a rigid-pricing scheme. In the best rigid-pricing scheme, rms share the market at the price r as long as no rms deviate:
Rigid-Pricing Scheme: A set of strategies where, on the equilibrium path, rms share the market equally at a xed price p 0 . Along the equilibrium path, for all i and t, p i;t = p 0 and q i;t = 1 (non-binding quantity restrictions), and announcements are uninformative. In a best rigid-pricing scheme, p 0 = r.
Another class of pooling equilibria use non-stationary strategies that take a \carrot-stick"
form. Formally, we de ne a carrot-stick scheme as follows:
Carrot-Stick Scheme: A set of strategies where, on and o of the equilibrium path, announcements are uninformative and q i;t = 1 (non-binding quantity restrictions). There are two states. In the war state, all rms choose price p w < r; and in the reward state, all rms charge price equal to r. The rms begin in the war state. In the war state, if all rms choose price p w in a given period; the rms switch to the reward state with probability 2 [0; 1]; and return to the war state with probability 1 : In the reward state, if all rms choose price r in a given period, the rms remain in the reward state with probability 1. In each period, if any rm charges a price other than the assigned price, the rms switch to the war state with probability 1. In a worst carrot-stick scheme, in the initial period, a rm with the highest type,
; is indi erent between choosing the price p w and charging a higher price, where by charging a higher price the rm would sell nothing and restart the scheme with probability 1.
In a carrot-stick scheme, rms may be induced to price below cost in the present period, when they anticipate the reward of getting a high price in the future. But no such scheme can be used in a PPBE if the highest type, ; is unwilling to charge p w in the war state. In particular, the war state prevails in the initial period, and the highest type then cannot prefer a deviation in which it selects a higher price, sells nothing and restarts the war state in the second period. This motivates our de nition of the worst carrot-stick scheme. As con rmed in the Appendix, in a worst carrot-stick scheme, if a rm begins the game with the highest type, then it earns a payo , v cs ( ), that is positive in Model 1 and zero in Model 2. Intuitively, in Model 1, if the payo to such a rm is too low, then this rm would prefer to \sit out" for a period and re-start the war state in the next period, when its type may be instead. We show further that, in a worst carrot-stick scheme, the payo to a rm with cost type i;t is
s=t s t i;s i;t is the expected discounted unit cost for rm i; given that rm i currently has cost type i;t .
Within the class of strategies characterized by pooling, payo s are clearly maximized when the best rigid-pricing scheme is used. Thus, if rms are su ciently patient to enforce the best rigid-pricing scheme in a PPBE, then the resulting best rigid-pricing equilibrium is a best pooling equilibrium. As is well known, it is easier to enforce an equilibrium when a more severe punishment is employed following any deviation. We impose here that the punishment takes the form of a worst carrot-stick equilibrium. 10 The following result establishes the existence of a critical discount factor above which a best (rigid-pricing) pooling equilibrium can be supported by a worst carrot-stick pooling equilibrium. Proof: See Appendix.
We observe that the critical discount factor is independent of the degree of persistence of cost types. The proof shows that the critical discount factor is determined by the constraint that a rm with the lowest cost type, ; must not gain from deviating by undercutting the price r in the reward state. This constraint re ects a tradeo for such a rm between the immediate bene t from undercutting and thus serving the entire market and the future cost of triggering the war state and thereby diminishing the continuation value. The cost outweighs the bene t if the rm is su ciently patient. Intuitively, the persistence of the rm's cost type enters by a ecting the continuation values that it expects after cooperation and deviation, respectively.
But whether the rm cooperates or deviates will not a ect its expected discounted unit cost level, . Furthermore, in a carrot-stick equilibrium, the market share that a rm enjoys is independent of whether the rm deviated in the past. Thus, while a deviation reduces a rm's expected future revenue, it does not alter the rm's expected future costs. Consequently, the extent to which a deviation causes a diminishment in the continuation value is independent of the degree of persistence in cost types.
Pooling equilibria are appealingly simple, in that both on and o the equilibrium path, no messages are sent and no new information about types is revealed. If initial beliefs are equal to the prior, rms' beliefs about opponents remain xed at the prior. Thus, a key feature of our constructed pooling equilbria is that beliefs about opponents do not play an important role. Carrot-stick equilibria can thus serve as punishments supporting other equilibria without modi cation, even when information about types has been revealed. 10 In general, there will be more severe punishments than the worst carrot-stick scheme; in particular, punishments with some separation of types will typically be worse. See Section 5 for an example.
The Optimality of Pooling Equilibria with Extreme Persistence
In this subsection, we establish that pooling is (approximately) optimal when the persistence of cost shocks is (near-) perfect, if the prior distribution F 0 is log-concave or if r is large enough.
We show that partial pooling may be optimal when these conditions are not satis ed.
Pooling Is Optimal with Perfect Persistence
We focus here on Model 2 and thus analyze the special case where rm cost types are perfectly persistent. In particular, we characterize the best collusive equilibrium from the perspective of rms at the beginning of the game, before they learn their cost types. As a punishment equilibrium, we use the worst carrot-stick equilibrium of Proposition 1. Our main result is robust to allowing for small probabilities that types change over time, and thus the result can be thought of as a limiting case.
Recall now the distinction between on-schedule (unobservable) deviations and o -schedule (observable) deviations. Under perfect persistence, mimicking one type throughout the entire game is an on-schedule deviation, and any other deviation is an o -schedule deviation. This is true because mimicking one type, and then another type, reveals that the rm must have misrepresented at one point, given that cost types do not change throughout the game.
The main result of this subsection establishes that the best rigid-pricing equilibrium described in Proposition 1 is optimal ex ante under fairly mild parameter restrictions. To prove this result, we proceed in two steps. First, we maximize ex ante rm pro ts in a relaxed setting, where we choose market share and revenue functions directly and require only that on-schedule deviations are unattractive. When F 0 is log-concave or r is large enough, we show that the optimal market share and revenue functions can be achieved when rms use the best rigid-pricing scheme. Second, we consider whether the solution in the relaxed setting is also immune to o -schedule deviations. Here, we recall from Proposition 1 that the best rigid-pricing scheme is actually immune to all deviations, including o -schedule deviations, when c .
Proposition 2. Consider Model 2: Suppose that c ; for c de ned in Proposition 1. Then, if F 0 is log-concave or if r is large enough, an (ex ante) optimal PPBE is the best rigid-pricing equilibrium described in Proposition 1.
Proof: First, we maximize ex ante rm pro ts in a relaxed setting, in which we choose market share and revenue functions subject to the on-schedule incentive constraint. Let R i (^ i;1 ) and M i (^ i;1 ) denote the expected future discounted revenues and market shares that rm i anticipates if it mimics type^ i;1 throughout the game. If rm i's type is i;1 ; then the present discounted value of pro ts for rm i can be represented as
The on-schedule incentive-compatibility constraint requires that, for all i,
By standard arguments, (3.1) holds only if
and (by the envelope theorem)
Using (3.3) and integration by parts, (3.1) implies that
We now de ne the relaxed program: Choose a value R i ( ) and a function M i ( i;1 ) to maximize (3.4) subject to (3.2),
; and (3.5)
where (3.5) is imposed since rms (and strategies) are assumed ex ante symmetric 11 and (3.6) is imposed since type cannot sell its market share at a price higher than r: We emphasize that the constraints of the relaxed program are substantially less restrictive than those that would be imposed were we to maximize over strategies that form a PPBE.
If F 0 is log-concave or if r is large enough, we may now use Proposition 5 of Athey, Bagwell and Sanchirico (2004) to show that the relaxed program is solved when M i ( i;1 )
In particular, their result shows that among all functions M i ( i;1 ) that satisfy (3.2) and (3.5), the last term of (3.4) is maximized when M i ( i;1 )
The central idea is easily understood: log-concavity is equivalent to
f 0 ( i;1 ) nondecreasing, and so the last term of (3.4) is maximized when M i puts as much weight as possible on high realizations of i;1 ; subject to the constraints that M i is nonincreasing and must achieve a given average value (i.e., subject to (3.2) and (3.5)). This is accomplished when M i is constant in i;1 . 12 Consider now the rst term in (3.4). Observe that
I ; where the rst inequality follows from (3.6) and the second inequality follows from (3.2) and 11 If we allowed for ex ante asymmetric strategies (and thus market shares), we would need to modify the arguments to require that total ex ante expected market share (across all rms) is 1=(1 ); but we would allow the ex ante expectations to di er across rms. Given any vector of rm-speci c ex ante expected market shares, pooling will be optimal under the conditions stated in the proposition, except that the critical discount factor must be increased due to the increased temptation of the disadvantaged rm to cheat.
12 Formally, since
is a probability density. Since F0=f0 is nondecreasing, the expected value of F0=f0 with respect to g is increased if the associated distribution G( i;1; Mi) is shifted by First-Order Stochastic Dominance (FOSD). But if M (3.5). Thus, the rst term in (3.4) is maximized when M i ( )
Likewise, if r is large enough, then the rst term of (3.4) dominates the second, so that again the maximum is achieved when M i ( )
We now observe that the revenue value and market share function that solves the relaxed program, in fact, can be achieved by strategies in the extensive form game. In particular, the best rigid-pricing scheme delivers ex ante market share and revenue to each rm of ; respectively, and so the solution to the relaxed program is achieved. We have already established in Proposition 1 that when c , the best rigid-pricing scheme is used in a PPBE of the game. Thus, the best rigid-pricing equilibrium described in Proposition 1 must be an optimal equilibrium, when c and F 0 is log-concave or r is large enough.
Before proceeding, we comment on the approach of the proof of Proposition 2. We considered the solution to a relaxed problem, where strategies only needed to be immune to a restricted class of deviations, whereby one cost type mimics another for all time. It was fortuitous that the solution took such a simple form, and that the solution was immune to all types of deviations. 13
A di erent solution to the relaxed problem might not have been an equilibrium to the original game. Indeed, this situation occurs when we relax the parameter restrictions of Proposition 2, as we show in Section 3.2.3.
It might seem that it would be advantageous for rms to signal their cost types at the beginning of the game and then enjoy the bene ts of collusion with complete information about costs for the remainder of the game. However, Proposition 2 shows that such an equilibrium is not optimal if rms are su ciently patient. Part of the intuition follows from the fact that the signaling costs must be proportional to the gains from signaling. If a low-cost rm expects a market-share advantage for the remainder of the game, it will be willing to expend great costs signaling at the beginning. A more subtle intuition highlights the role of log-concavity of F 0 :
This is an important condition: as we con rm below in Section 3.2.3, if r is close to and F 0 is not log-concave, the best rigid-pricing scheme may no longer be optimal. Log-concavity is equivalent to requiring that
is nondecreasing. Giving more market share to higher-cost types, as in a rigid-pricing scheme, allows lower-cost types to get higher utility in equilibrium, without inducing mimicry from higher-cost types. The term
of this e ect. When it is higher for higher types, it is optimal to allocate more market share to higher types, in spite of the resulting e ciency losses.
This result is closely related to a nding of McAfee and McMillan (1992) . They show that in a static cartel, when no monetary transfers are allowed and there is no future to provide incentives, the optimal mechanism for the cartel is a rigid-pricing strategy, if it can somehow be enforced. Athey, Bagwell, and Sanchirico (2004) provide a similar result in a repeated game model of a self-enforcing cartel, where costs are i.i.d. over time. In that context, non-stationary 13 Indeed, we have proved something stronger than stated in the proposition: rigid pricing is optimal among all Bayesian Nash equilibria that are immune only to deviations from on-path histories.
equilibria are possible, and the prospect of a reduced continuation value may thus deter a high-cost type from mimicking a low-cost type. Athey, Bagwell, and Sanchirico (2004) focus on equilibria that are strongly symmetric, however, and so any use of future continuation values to provide incentives is necessarily wasteful from the perspective of the cartel, as it must take the form of an industry-wide price war. The availability of an industry-wide price war would correspond to a limited form of transfers in a static model. In this context, they nd that the optimal equilibrium does not use industry-wide price wars to provide incentives. Instead, the best rigid-pricing scheme is optimal.
In the context of collusion with perfectly persistent cost types, Proposition 2 shows that the best rigid-pricing scheme is also optimal. Importantly, we obtain this result while allowing for asymmetric (and non-stationary) equilibria; in particular, utility can be transferred from one rm to another through future play (as well as \wasted" through industry-wide price wars).
However, because cost types do not change over time, if a low-type rm transfers utility to a high-type rm by giving up future market share, this transfer must be ine cient. This contrasts with the rst-best result presented in Athey and Bagwell (2001) , who study a model where cost types are discrete and i.i.d. over time, and asymmetric equilibria are allowed. It is then possible for a rm that has low costs today to make an e cient future transfer to a rm that has high costs today. The rms achieve an e cient future transfer by waiting for a date in which they have the same cost type.
Our result is also related to a well-known nding (see, e.g., Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991, pp. 299-301) in the dynamic contracting literature. This nding states that, in a dynamic principal-agent model with persistent types, if the principal has commitment power, then it is impossible for the principal to improve upon a mechanism that replicates the optimal static mechanism in each period. Under the assumptions of log-concavity and su cient patience, we also nd that the optimal dynamic solution entails the repeated play of the optimal static solution. Despite this apparent similarity, our analysis di ers in several respects. There is no \principal" in our model who commits to allocations and transfers as a function of reports.
Indeed we analyze schemes that are optimal from the ex ante perspective of \agents" (i.e., rms). While the principal-agent model allows monetary transfers to \settle up" transfers of utility immediately, we assume that direct sidepayments between rms are infeasible, and so state-contingent transfers of utility may need to be implemented through subsequent play, play that must respect incentive constraints given current information. In other words, in the PPBE of our dynamic game, agents cannot make commitments with respect to their future behavior.
In Section 3.2.3, we analyze an example in which log concavity fails and nd that, even if agents are very patient, the optimal mechanism with commitment cannot be achieved as a PPBE of the dynamic game.
Our result that the best rigid-pricing scheme is optimal builds from two key assumptions:
inelastic demand and linear costs. We now discuss how the results change when these assump-tions are relaxed. First, we note that rigid pricing has two important features. First, the allocation of market share is ine cient. Second, there is pooling: all types receive the same outcomes. We argue that some productive ine ciency is a robust feature of our model but that full pooling is not. Yet, pooling is not a knife-edge result: it strictly dominates the alternatives in our baseline model; and for cost functions and demand speci cations su ciently close to our baseline model, pooling remains optimal.
First, consider variations on the speci cation of demand. In the supplementary material, we brie y analyze models in which (i) products are perfect substitutes but demand is downwardsloping, (ii) products are imperfect substitutes, and (iii) rms compete in quantities. In case (i), we show that when demand is su ciently inelastic, the best rigid-pricing scheme is still optimal. In general, forces in favor of at least partial pooling remain present in all of the alternative models.
Second, consider costs that are nonlinear in output. Variation in market share for a given cost type can then either increase or decrease expected costs, depending on whether the cost function is concave or convex. In addition, it is possible that a rm's expected market share can be non-monotonic in its cost type without violating incentive compatibility, since not only the mean but also the variance of the market share for a particular cost type a ect payo s for that type. Despite these complications, we show in the supplementary material that when costs are concave in output, a best rigid-pricing equilibrium o ers strictly higher payo s than any equilibrium in which the highest-cost type receives less than 1=I market share in each period (the market share under rigid pricing). However, we have not ruled out the (seemingly pathological) possibility that pro ts can be increased by resorting to an even more extreme form of ine ciency with some separation of types, where the highest-cost type gets even greater than average market share.
Pooling Is Approximately Optimal with Near-Perfect Persistence
Our next result shows that the best pooling equilibrium is approximately optimal in Model 1, when persistence gets high enough. This con rms that the result of Proposition 2 can be taken as a limiting case. As mentioned in the Introduction, incentives as well as the possible evolution of beliefs may be distinctly di erent in models where types are xed with probability 1 and models where types can change with positive probability. However, in pooling equilibria, these distinctions are less important.
To establish our limiting result, we consider a sequence f n L ; n H g such that lim n!1 f n L ; n H g = f1; 0g; and such that F n 0 = F 0 ; where F n 0 is the prior (stationary) distribution given f n L ; n H g: Although our proof does not make use of the particular form of the sequence, for concreteness we de ne
(3.7)
Corollary 1. Consider Model 1: Fix > c . Let the sequence f n L ; n H g be de ned in (3.7). If (r )=( )> 1 F 0 ( ); then the limit as n ! 1 of the payo achieved by a given rm in the optimal ex ante PPBE approaches
; which is also the payo attained by the best rigid-pricing scheme given F 0 and perfectly persistent types.
Proof: See Appendix.
This result can be understood in two parts. First, the parameter restriction implies that pooling is optimal when types are perfectly persistent, so that the analog of Proposition 2 holds for a two-type model. Second, we show that payo s are upper hemi-continuous in the persistence parameter.
Partial Pooling May Be Optimal when Log-Concavity Fails
So far, we have focused on the case where the prior distribution F 0 is log-concave or r is large enough. We now consider how the analysis would change if these conditions fail. In that event, it is direct to show that in a static mechanism design problem, or in a repeated game with cost types that are i.i.d. over time, the optimal scheme typically entails partial pooling. However, a number of subtleties arise when analyzing the repeated game with perfectly persistent types.
To focus our discussion, consider a prior distribution with the following properties: there exists z 2 ( ; ) such that F 0 ( i;1 )=f 0 ( i;1 ) is strictly increasing on [ ; z) and on (z; ]; but The following class of schemes has separation between two steps. How much the market shares di er for the two regions of types is a parameter of the scheme.
Two-
Step Scheme: A set of strategies where, on and o of the equilibrium path, announcements are uninformative. We may then suppress notation and represent the pricing strategy within a period as i;t ( i;1 ): For i;1 2 [ ; z); i;1 ( i;1 ) = p L and i;t ( i;1 ) = r for all t > 1, while for i;1 2 [z; ]; i;t ( i;1 ) = r for all t. In period 1, each player makes the (nonbinding) quantity restriction q i;t = 1, so that the market share allocation is 1/I if all choose the same price, and otherwise the low-price rms serve the market. If N rms tied for the lowest price in period 1, then in all subsequent periods each of these N rms sets q i;t = (1 (I N )k)=N , while all other rms set q i;t = k; where k 2 [0; 1=I). Any o -schedule deviation results in a switch to the worst carrot-stick scheme analyzed in Proposition 1. The price p L is determined by the on-schedule incentive constraint in the rst period, and so it will depend on k; for simplicity, we allow that p L may be negative.
Simple Two-Step Scheme: A Two-Step Scheme with k = 0:
We show below that the simple two-step scheme does not satisfy all relevant o -schedule incentive constraints, but we begin by analyzing it as a benchmark. To compare the best rigidpricing scheme with the simple two-step scheme, let y be the expected discounted market share for types on [ ; z): Using (3.4), ex ante expected pro ts as a function of y are
This expression is increasing in y if
Then, when (3.8) holds, pro ts will be strictly higher with the simple two-step scheme, which gives greater market share to types on [ ; z):
Example 1, cont.: Condition (3.8) holds if 1 ; 2 2 (0; 3); and
This requires that 4=3 > r and 1 + 2 < (3 9(r 1))=2: If r = 1:2 and 1 + 2 = 1=5; (3.8)
So, when (3.8) holds, the simple two-step scheme would dominate the best rigid-pricing scheme, if the simple two-step scheme were a PPBE. But it is not. To see why, suppose 1;1 < z and > 2;1 > z: Starting in the second period, rm 2 makes 0 pro t under the simple two-step scheme. As rm 2 makes positive pro t under the worst carrot-stick equilibrium, it would make an o -schedule deviation (e.g., undercutting r in period 2) and trigger the punishment.
We can salvage an equilibrium with partial pooling, however, by specifying that rms 1 and 2 share the market, unequally, after period 1. We de ne M cs ( i;t ) as the minimum market share that a rm must receive to deter an o -schedule deviation in periods t > 1 when rms price at r: This must satisfy 1) . Recall that the worst carrot-stick equilibrium can be supported over this discount-factor interval. Now, consider the following modi cation of the simple two-step scheme.
Market-Sharing Two-Step Scheme: A two-step scheme with k = M cs (z):
The price p L is determined by the on-schedule incentive constraint in the rst period, and so it will take on a di erent value than in the simple two-step scheme.
By construction, the market-sharing two-step scheme satis es on-schedule constraints in period 1. After period 1, strategies specify behavior as a function of rst-period observed behavior, and there are no additional on-schedule constraints. Since M cs ( i;1 ) 1=I; all rms receive market share greater than or equal to M cs ( i;1 ); and so o -schedule constraints are satis ed for all rms in periods t > 1: It remains only to consider the o -schedule constraints in period 1. (i) For all 2 [ c ; 1); there exists a market-sharing two-step equilibrium.
(ii) If (3.8) holds, the market-sharing two-step equilibrium yields greater ex ante expected pro ts than the best rigid-pricing equilibrium.
The rst part of this result shows that the market-sharing two-step equilibrium exists whenever the best rigid-pricing equilibrium exists ( c ). To establish that no additional patience is required to support the market-sharing two-step scheme, we show that it is the lowest-cost type who is most tempted to deviate from the best rigid-pricing scheme. With the two-step scheme, low-cost types expect to receive greater market share in the rst period, and so gain less from undercutting either their assigned price (p L ) or the price assigned to higher-cost types (r): 14 The second part of Proposition 3 shows that it is possible to improve upon the best-rigid pricing scheme, when r is not too large and F 0 is not log-concave. We have not, however, proved that the market-sharing two-step equilibrium is optimal. A scheme with multiple steps would achieve further separation of types in the rst period and thereby allocate lower market share 14 Thus, if a punishment were available that required less patience to implement than the worst carrot-stick equilibrium; it would be possible to support the market-sharing two-step scheme with a lower range of discount factors than that required to support the best rigid-pricing scheme. As de ned, however, the market-sharing two-step scheme relies on the worst carrot-stick equilibrium, and we require c for that equilibrium to exist.
to the higher cost types in future periods. The e ect of addtional steps on ex ante expected pro t, however, is sensitive to the precise way in which F 0 fails to be log-concave.
Before proceeding, we pause to interpret the market-sharing two-step equilibrium. In this equilibrium, there is an initial signalling phase, where some rms set low prices (and thus receive a higher market share than the remaining rms). In all subsequent periods, rms that initially cut prices receive more market share than those who did not, but all rms have some market share. Notice that empirically, this behavior might appear to entail an initial \price war"
followed by a \collusive phase," where the market shares during the price war phase determine the market shares of the \collusive phase." Roos (2003) argues that a price war in the lysine industry started by Archer Daniels Midland in the early 1990s had these characteristics.
Equilibria with Some Productive E ciency
In this section, we study equilibria with at least some productive e ciency. First, we establish that when rms are su ciently patient, there exist simple equilibria with partial productive e ciency and pricing at r. However, as persistence of types grows, the degree of productive e ciency approaches zero, even if rms are very patient. Second, we construct more sophisticated equilibria with productive e ciency and pricing at r on the equilibrium path. These rst-best equilibria exist when rms are patient relative to the persistence of cost types.
Partial Productive E ciency with Arbitrary Persistence
Consider Model 1. We show that so long as is greater than c ; the critical discount factor for supporting the best rigid-pricing equilibrium, it is possible to improve upon the best rigidpricing equilibrium. To accomplish this, we introduce a simple odd-even scheme, whereby rms report their types in odd periods and implement partial productive e ciency. In even periods, the rms that received higher market share in the prior period must reduce their market share.
The even-period market shares are determined so as to provide incentives for truthful revelation in the odd periods. i (a t ) = 1 for all a t 2 A: If t is an odd period, rms announce their cost types, so that a t = t : Then, the rms choose p i;t = r; but they share the market unequally, as determined by q i;t = o i (a t ). In period t + 1; an even period, announcements are uninformative. All rms choose p i;t+1 = r; and q i;t+1 = e i (a t ): In all periods, any o -schedule deviation is punished by switching to a worst carrot-stick scheme.
Odd-Even
In the Appendix proof of Proposition 4, we formally de ne a value function for an odd-even equilibrium, as well as the on-and o -schedule constraints. Here, we provide some intuition about the role of the constraints and when they will bind, focusing for simplicity on the case where I = 2. In an on-schedule deviation, a rm that just observed its cost type i;t in odd period t mimics type^ i;t throughout periods t and t+1 (since the strategies call for uninformative announcements in period t + 1). If low-cost types receive more market share in odd periods ( o i (L; H) > 1=2), the binding on-schedule incentive constraint will be the constraint that deters a high-cost type from mimicking a low-cost type in an odd period. This deviation will be deterred if e i (L; H) is su ciently low and e i (H; L) is su ciently high. The most tempting o -schedule deviation has a rm undercut the collusive price of r. Such a deviation may be tempting in either an odd period or an even period; in an even period t + 1, such a deviation yields a short-term gain of (1 e i ( i;t ; j;t ))(r i;t+1 ): The even-period o -schedule constraint is especially likely to bind if ( i;t ; j;t ) = (L; H) and i;t+1 = L, since (in order to respect the on-schedule constraints when o i (L; H) > 1=2) we will have e i (L; H) < 1=2: For > c ; we now establish that an odd-even equilibrium can be constructed that achieves a strictly higher ex ante payo for rms than does the best rigid-pricing equilibrium. An attractive feature of the constructed scheme is that the on-schedule incentive constraints are satis ed pointwise (so that announcing truthfully is ex post incentive compatible); thus, the speci c manner in which beliefs are formed about the evolution of rivals' costs is unimportant.
The proof builds from two insights. First, starting from the best rigid-pricing equilibrium, it is possible to maintain on-schedule incentive compatibility and raise the ex ante payo for rms, by making an intertemporal exchange in market shares under which a rm that reveals itself to have low (high) costs in the odd period experiences an increase (decrease) in its odd-period market share and a decrease (increase) in its market share in the subsequent even period. Intuitively, market share is then redistributed from known high-cost rms to a known low-cost rm in the odd period, while in the subsequent period market share is redistributed from a rm that, under imperfect persistence, probably has low costs to rms that probably have high costs. Second, when the intertemporal exchange in market shares is small, the o -schedule constraints are sure to be satis ed provided that > c ; so that these constraints are slack under the best rigid-pricing equilibrium. This follows since the odd-even value function is continuous in the market shares and the odd-even equilibrium is identical to the best rigid-pricing equilibrium in the limit, when e i (a t ) = o i (a t ) = 1=I for all a t : For some parameter values (e.g. when persistence is low), the improvement in the future value of cooperation attained by increasing productive e ciency relaxes the o -schedule constraints enough so that large intertemporal exchanges of market share become possible even at = c .
Proposition 4. Consider Model 1. If > c ; then there exists an odd-even equilibrium, where this equilibrium achieves strictly higher ex ante payo s than the best rigid-pricing equilibrium.
We next consider optimal equilibria within the odd-even class. For given parameter val-ues, the market share choices that maximize ex ante expected pro ts in the class of odd-even equilibria can be computed using standard linear programming techniques. The downward on-schedule constraint (whereby type H is tempted to mimic L) is binding in all odd periods t. If t is odd and t = (L; H); rm 1's market share is .59 in period t and .42 in period t+1: The o -schedule constraint limits productive e ciency: to increase o 1 (L; H); a decrease in e 1 (L; H) is required to respect on-schedule constraints, but the o -schedule constraint for rm 1's low type in even periods prevents a large decrease.
Even though market shares uctuate in the odd-even equilibrium of Example 2, very little e ciency is gained. Although production is fairly e cient in each odd period, production is fairly ine cient in even periods. With persistent types, a realization of (L; H) is often followed by another realization of (L; H): In the even period, the low-cost rm then serves less than half of the market. Indeed, using the prior distribution of costs, the average cost over an average two-period cycle is 1.663, just slightly below the average cost in a pooling equilibrium of 1.667, and far above the prior expected value of the minimum of the two rms' costs, 1.444. Numerical calculations con rm that for more moderate persistence than Example 2, oschedule constraints are typically slack at = c ; and there is productive e ciency in odd periods. However, even periods have substantial ine ciency.
The odd-even scheme has very limited history-dependence on the equilibrium path. That limitation may be quite important. To gain some intuition, let us modify the odd-even scheme to allow e 1 to depend on a t 2 as well as a t :
Example 3: Consider the parameter values of Example 2: Then, the (modi ed) odd-even equilibrium that maximizes ex ante expected pro ts The market shares in even periods are set to maximize productive e ciency while still respecting the on-schedule incentive constraints, which bind in odd periods. Suppose that t 2 is odd, and that a t 2 = (L; H), in which case rm 1 serves the entire market in period t 2. Firm 1 must receive reduced market share in a period following t 2 in order to respect the on-schedule incentive constraint. However, it is likely that rm 1 will also be low cost in period t 1: In order to keep market share for rm 1 as high as possible in period t 1, it is useful to put o some of the \punishment" of rm 1 to a future period. We see from Table 1 that e i (L; L; L; H) is equal to .205. Given that t = (L; L); there is no expected e ciency loss in the even period t + 1 from reducing market share for rm 1. But, this low market share helps relax the on-schedule incentive constraint for rm 1 in period t 2:
In the equilibrium of Example 3, expected cost is 1.62, 2.6% lower than in Example 2.
However, the low productive e ciency in even periods still limits the productive e ciency of the mechanism. Even when approaches 1, the average cost never gets lower than 1.588. The example illustrates how greater history-dependence can help: incentives for rm 1 to admit high cost in period t 2 are provided by granting additional market share to rm 1 in period t + 1; in the event that both rms have the same cost in period t:
More generally, numerical calculations con rm the following regularities. For any level of persistence, there is an upper bound on the e ciency gain from the odd-even scheme. As the persistence of cost types grows, this upper bound approaches zero.
First-Best with Moderate Persistence
In this subsection, we focus on Model 1 with two rms (I = 2) and show that it is possible to attain rst-best collusion for some parameter values (values where patience is high relative to persistence). The collusive scheme that delivers these payo s is referred to as a rst-best scheme and is a generalization of that proposed by Athey and Bagwell (2001) . In each period, rms announce their cost types. If one rm has high cost and the other has low cost, the lowcost rm serves the market. If both have the same cost, the rms split the market, typically unevenly, where the splits are a function of past reports and are constructed to favor rms who have announced high costs in the past.
First-Best Scheme: A set of strategies in which, along the equilibrium path, rms announce their cost types and price at r in each period, so that a t = t and p i;t = r. Further, quantity restrictions satisfy productive e ciency: if a i;t = L and a j;t = H; then q i;t = 1 and q j;t = 0: In all periods, any o -schedule deviation is punished by switching to the worst carrot-stick scheme.
It remains to specify q t when a i;t = a j;t as a function of history. On the equilibrium path, play depends on a t 1 as well as which of the two rms is \favored." We represent this using \states," ! 1 ( t 1 ) and ! 2 ( t 1 ); where rm 1 prefers ! 1 ( t 1 ) to ! 2 ( t 1 ): Let the set of states that may be reached on the equilibrium path be denoted gets market share 1 q 1 ( t ; j; t 1 ); and they subsequently move to state ! 1 ( t ) with probabilitỹ g( t ; j; t 1 ) and to state ! 2 ( t ) with probability 1 g( t ; j; t 1 ):
For concreteness, consider the following example.
Example 4: Let r = 2:1; H = 2; L = 1; L = :7; H = :5 and = :92 > c = :917: Using the representation just described, the following table can be used to construct strategies for a rst-best scheme. 
. 5 The entries in the table incorporate productive e ciency: in every state,q 1 (L; H; j; t 1 ) = 1 q 1 (H; L; j; t 1 ) = 1. The entryg( t ; j; t 1 ) = 0 speci es that following t = (L; H); the rms transition to state ! 2 (L; H) (the state that favors rm 2) with probability 1. Similarly, following t = (H; L); the rms transition to the state that favors rm 1, ! 1 (H; L); with probability 1. The transitions following \ties" ( t = (L; L) or t = (H; H)) favor each rm equally in each state. In some states, market shares in the case of \ties" are unequal: the favored rm receives more market share. Note the states ! 1 (L; H) and ! 2 (H; L) are not used.
An interesting feature of this example is that communication and binding quantity constraints are not necessary to implement the rst-best scheme. The market share divisions can be accomplished by judicious choices of prices. For example, in state (1; L; L); rm 1's highcost type prices at r " and its low-cost type prices at r 2"; while rm 2's high-cost type prices at r and its low-cost type prices at r 2": However, in general, the set of parameters for which rst-best equilibria exist is smaller when communication and quantity constraints are not available, since eliminating these instruments places additional constraints on the scheme.
How does one verify that a rst-best scheme is in fact a PPBE? In a repeated game, the dynamic programming tools of Stacchetti (1986, 1990) can be applied to construct \self-generating" sets of equilibrium values. In the supplementary material for this article, we describe this in detail. Here, we show that it is possible to verify whether a rst-best scheme is a PPBE by solving a system of linear equations that de ne a rm's value in each state as a function of its cost type, and then checking appropriately de ned on-schedule and o -schedule incentive constraints.
The rst step is to construct extensive form strategies that specify play following any public history. Given an initial state, we can determine the state of the game following any history (where the history includes the outcome of public randomization) simply by tracking through the transitions speci ed by the strategies. If following a particular history the state is determined to be ! j ( t 1 ) 2 e , period strategies are given by ( i;t ( i;t ); i;t (a t ; i;t ); i;t (a t ; i;t )) = ( i;t ; r;q i (a t ; j; t 1 )) s i (a t ; i;t ; j; t 1 ):
Following every history up to time t, if announcements in period t are given by a t ; beliefs in period t + 1 are given by F( ; a t ). 15
Let V be the set of functions v =(v 1 ; ::; v I ) such that v i : i ! R: This is the set of possible \type-contingent payo functions," specifying payo s to each rm as a function of its true type in a particular period. If V maps from Z to V, we can interpret V i as an analog of a continuation value function, but one that maps from today's public outcomes to a vector of future values, one for each type that rm i could be in the next period. Given such a V i ; and given beliefs about opponents t and posited strategies s t , the following represents rm i's expected payo s in period t, before announcements are made, when rm i has type i;t and mimics type^ i;t : u i (^ i;t ; i;t ; s t ; i;t ; V i ) = i (^ i;t ; i;t ; s t ; i;t ) + E i;t+1 ; i;t h V i s t ( t (^ i;t ; i;t ); (^ i;t ; i;t )) ( i;t+1 ) i;t ; i;t i :
The motivation for considering type-contingent payo functions becomes clear when we see that future values depend on today's \reported type"^ i;t through the induced public actions that serve to select a continuation equilibrium; while rm i constructs its beliefs about the future distribution of i;t+1 based on its true type.
We now de ne two functions,ṽ 2V andṼ mapping from Z to V, through the following system of equations for each rm i.
For all (j; t 1 ) 2 f1; 2g : (4.3)
V i (a t ; p t ; q t ; j; t 1 ) =g(a t ; j; t 1 )ṽ i ( ; 1; a t ) + (1 g(a t ; j; t 1 ))ṽ i ( ; 2; a t ) whenever a t 2 ; p t = (r; r); and q t =q t (^ t ; j; t 1 );
andṼ i (a t ; p t ; q t ; j; t 1 ) = v cs otherwise, wherẽ v i ( i;t ; j; t 1 ) = u i ( i;t ; i;t ; s; i ; V i ) with s =s( ; j; t 1 ); i = F ( ; i;t 1 ); V i =Ṽ i ( ; j; t 1 ):
Standard arguments (e.g. Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1986) ) can be used to verify that, if
we consider a particular ! j ( ) 2 e , if initial beliefs are F( ; ) and extensive-form strategies and beliefs are speci ed using the construction outlined above,ṽ i ( 0 i ; j; ) is indeed the expected discounted future payo that player i expects after observing type 0 i : It remains to specify incentive constraints that ensure that a set of strategies are best responses given beliefs following every history. We have already veri ed that starting from any initial beliefs, the carrot-stick strategy pro les form a PPBE for discount factors above a critical level, so we focus on ! j ( ) 2 e : It is straightforward to verify that some types of deviations are dominated. For example, announcing a type outside of i is dominated by a deviation with an announcement in i followed by a price of r ": This deviation also dominates deviations involving quantity restrictions or lower prices. The following constraint guarantees that all o -schedule deviations are deterred for rm i in state ! j ( t 1 ) 2 e : v i ( i;t ; j; t 1 ) r i;t + v cs : (4.4)
On-schedule deviations are deterred for rm i in state ! j ( t 1 ) 2 e if 8 i;t ;^ i;t ;ṽ i ( i;t ; j; t 1 ) u i (^ i;t ; i;t ;s( ; j; t 1 ); F ( ; i;t 1 );Ṽ i ( ; j; t 1 )):
(4.5)
Note that initial beliefs at the start of the game may not be among those in the rst-best scheme (f : = F( ; t ) for some t g). The scheme can be augmented to allow for initial beliefs, but we do not introduce notation for that here.
Summarizing this analysis, we have
Proposition 5. Fix I = 2 and consider the two-type model with imperfect persistence, with primitives ; r; L; H; and F, with c . Fix the speci cation of a rst-best schemeg andq 1 ; and de ne the correspondings andṼ as in (4.2) and (4.3). If for each (i; j; t 1 ) 2 f1; 2g 2 , the on-schedule and o -schedule constraints, (4.5) and (4.4), hold; then this rst-best scheme is a PPBE set that yields rst-best pro ts in every period.
Proposition 5 can be applied to Example 4. It identi es the incentive constraints that can be checked to guarantee that a rst-best scheme is a PPBE. However, the result does not
give any indication of whether, for a given set of primitives, there will exist a speci cation for (4.1) that can satisfy the incentive constraints. It turns out that it is cumbersome to give necessary and su cient conditions for speci cations such that the rst-best equilibrium exists, since that exercise involves searching over a large-dimensional space. However, we have constructed examples with a wide range of speci ations; a general theme, not surprisingly, is that patience needs to be large relative to persistence.
Productive E ciency with Perfect Persistence
As discussed in the last section, when patience is high relative to persistence, it may be possible to construct a rst-best equilibrium. We showed in Section 3 that when persistence is extreme, pooling is optimal or approximately optimal so long as the distribution of cost types is logconcave. In this section, we ask whether equilibria with productive e ciency exist at all when cost types are perfectly persistent. We show that even if we allow for low prices, productive e ciency requires that patience be low enough. In addition, the equilibrium we construct requires a severe form of punishment in the case of o -schedule deviations.
Separating Equilibria with Productive E ciency
We analyze here Model 2. Any proposed equilibrium with productive e ciency in each period must be immune to deviations whereby one type mimics another type in every period. This incentive compatibility requirement in turn implies 1) following the logic and using the notation from the proof of Proposition 2. That is, each player must expect per-period pro ts equal to those of the static Nash equilibrium. Thus, an equilibrium with productive e ciency would not be very pro table. Indeed, it can be shown that if ( )=I R (1 F (~ )) I 1 d~ ; then all types other than would earn strictly less in an equilibrium with productive e ciency than in the worst carrot-stick equilibrium. 16
However, it remains to analyze whether an equilibrium exists that delivers productive efciency. The static Nash equilibrium is no longer an equilibrium in the dynamic game, since beliefs change after rst-period play. Focusing on the case where I = 2, we now consider a productive e ciency scheme, in which rms do not communicate but rather set prices in a way that ensures productive e ciency in each period. Clearly, in the rst period of such a scheme, 16 Simply compare the pro ts of the two equilibria for each type, and note that the di erence is convex. The stated inequality holds (with equality) for the uniform distribution, for example.
the rms can achieve productive e ciency only if they use a pricing strategy that is strictly increasing in costs and symmetric across rms.
Productive E ciency Scheme: A set of strategies such that, in each period, announcements are uninformative and market share proposals are not binding (q i;t 1): The rst-period pricing strategy of rm i is denoted i;1 ( i;1 ); and is strictly increasing and symmetric across rms. Each rm infers the other rm's cost once rst-period prices are observed. Let w and l denote, respectively, the inferred cost of the \winner" (the lower-cost rm) and \loser" (the higher-cost rm) in the period-one pricing contest. Each rm adopts a stationary price along the equilibrium path in periods t > 1: Let ( w ; l ) denote the price selected by the winner in periods t > 1;
and we suppose that the loser charges " more. We restrict attention to ( w ; l ) 2 [ w ; l ]: 17 In all periods, any o -schedule deviation induces the belief threat punishment, as described below in Section 5.2.
When rms use a productive e ciency scheme, an o -schedule deviation may become apparent due to an inconsistency between a rm's rst-period and (say) second-period prices.
For example, suppose rm i has type i;1 and undertakes an on-schedule deviation in period 1 by mimicking the price of a higher type,^ i;1 > i;1 : Suppose rm j 's type is lower than i;1 ; so that rm j wins the rst-period pricing contest and enters period 2 with the belief that
If the scheme speci es a period-2 price for rm j such that i;1 < ( w ; l ); then rm i will charge the price ( w ; l ) " in period 2. Firm i's period 2 behavior then reveals its rst-period deviation, and in period 3 the rms proceed to the belief threat punishment.
Productive e ciency equilibria are di cult to construct. Separation in the rst period must be achieved, even though the rst-period price may a ect beliefs and thereby future pro ts. A subtlety arises because of a potential non-di erentiability of payo s in the rst period for a rm of type i;1 at i;1 ( i;1 ): If rm i charges i;1 (^ i;1 ) for^ i;1 > i;1 in the rst period; it is possible that^ i;1 > j;1 > i;1 ; in which case rm i will undercut rm j's period-2 price, ( j;1 ;^ i;1 ). On the other hand, if rm i charges i;1 (^ i;1 ) for^ i;1 < i;1 ; it is possible that^ i;1 < j;1 < i;1 ; in which case rm i would not select the period-2 price (^ i;1 ; j;1 ) but would instead set a higher price (e.g., above r) and earn zero pro t. Thus, payo s change at di erent rates for \upward" deviations than for \downward" deviations. However, if ( w ; l ) is strictly increasing in both arguments at appropriate rates, it is possible to exactly equalize the incentive to deviate upward with the incentive to deviate downward.
Strict monotonicity of ( w ; l ) in turn requires that the rst-period pricing schedule places each rm type above its static reaction curve (i.e., at a price such that rst-period expected pro t would be higher if a slightly lower price were selected). Intuitively, when a rm contemplates an increase in its rst-period price, it then foresees a loss in its rst-period expected pro t, and this loss is balanced against the bene t of the higher future price, ( w ; l ); that the rm would enjoy were it to win the rst-period pricing contest.
In the supplementary material for this article, we establish that a productive e ciency equilibrium exists if two conditions hold. The rst condition is that inf 0 i;1 > 00
and inf 0 i;1 < 00
and the second condition is that is su ciently small that, for all i;1 ;
(5.3)
For any < 1; the conditions hold when F 0 is su ciently close to uniform. As well, for any F 0 ;
the conditions hold if is su ciently small.
Proposition 6. Consider Model 2 and suppose I = 2. If (5.2) and (5.3) are satis ed, then there exists a productive e ciency equilibrium. Speci cally, in the rst period, each rm i uses the following strategy:
Let w = min( 1;1 ; 2;1 ), while l = max( 1;1 ; 2;1 ): If rm i is the low-cost rm in period 1, then for all t > 1; rm i sets price
while rm j 6 = i sets price p j;t = ( w ; l ) + " for " > 0:
Conditions (5.2) and (5.3) are satis ed in a rich parameter space; however, when they are not satis ed, a productive e ciency equilibrium may fail to exist. Intuitively, the highest-cost type ( ) gets no future pro t and thus prices at cost in the rst period. All other types, however, distort their rst-period prices upward, in an attempt to signal higher costs and thereby secure a higher future price. If rms are very patient, the bene t of a higher future price is signi cant, and greater distortions in the rst-period price are incurred. It is then possible that higher-cost types may price above and thus the rst-period price of the highest-cost type. This implies a non-monotonicity in the rst-period pricing function, in contradiction to the hypothesis of a separating equilibrium.
We conclude that separating equilibria with productive e ciency exist under certain conditions. 18
Such equilibria are characterized by strategic signaling in the rst period. They thus repre-18 As we show in the supplementary material section, when I = 2; if the parameters of the model satisfy conditions (5.2) and (5.3), then the cross-partial of the pro t function for type i;1 that mimics type^ i;1 is globally positive. Standard arguments then ensure that global incentive compatibility is implied by local incentive compatibility. When I > 2; we can show that an analogous productive e ciency equilibrium exists if is su ciently small; however, a di erent proof is required, since the cross-partial of the pro t function for type i;1 that mimics^ i;1 becomes negative for^ i;1 su ciently close to . For I > 2; we use numerical methods to verify directly that global incentive compatibility is satis ed if is su ciently low for the uniform distribution. sent the Bertrand counterpart to the separating equilbria constructed by Mailath (1989) for a two-period model with di erentiated products and perfectly persistent cost types.
Belief Threat Punishment
We now consider punishments that are not themselves equilibria at the start of the game, because they rely on beliefs that may only arise following a deviation from equilibrium. We seek to identify the most severe punishment of this sort. To this end, we employ the belief threat punishment: a deviant rm is forever after believed to have the lowest cost and is thus expected to charge a low price, regardless of the subsequent path of play, which in turn makes it rational for non-deviating rms to punish with their own low prices.
Belief Threat Punishment: Suppose that rm i engages in an o -schedule deviation in period : All rms j 6 = i thereafter believe that rm i has the lowest costs, ; and they set the price p j;t = + 2" in all future periods t > , regardless of the evolution of play. Now, if rm i indeed did have cost , then its best response against the belief threat punishment following its own deviation would in fact be to set p i;t = + ": If rm i does not have low cost, it chooses any price greater than p j;t : This behavior is sequentially rational -each rm is doing its best from any point forward, given its beliefs and the equilibrium strategies of other rms. Furthermore, this is the most severe possible punishment outcome, since a deviant rm earns zero pro t in the continuation game, independent of the discount factor.
While the belief threat punishment serves as a useful benchmark, it is not entirely plausible.
An immediate objection to the construction just presented is that all rm j's adopt dominated strategies (pricing below cost, for all histories) in the continuation. This objection can be handled easily, however, if we modify the above strategies to include a carrot-stick component.
Carrot-Stick Belief Threat Punishment: Suppose that rm i engages in an o -schedule deviation in period : The rms then impose a belief threat punishment with the modi cation that, in period t > , if the deviant rm i plays p i;t = + " and each rm j 6 = i plays p j;t = + 2"; then with some probability 2 (0; 1) the rms switch to the best rigid-pricing equilibrium: Otherwise, they continue with the described punishment strategies.
For su ciently low, the deviant rm still earns approximately zero pro t. But it is now a strict best response for a non-deviant rm j to select p j;t = + 2" throughout the punishment phase: this strategy induces a distribution over zero and positive pro ts, whereas any other strategy induces zero or negative pro t in the current period and serves only to delay the eventual escape to the collusive continuation. Thus, the described strategies are no longer dominated. In this case, the continuation play itself requires a discount factor that is su ciently high, since rms must be dissuaded from undercutting r in the punishment phase when > 0:
The (carrot-stick) belief threat punishment implies a new critical discount factor for the best rigid-pricing equilibrium. Formally: Proposition 7. Consider Model 2 and suppose > (I 1)=I: Then, there exists a best rigidpricing equilibrium. If rm i deviates, the continuation entails a carrot-stick belief threat punishment, and so rms j 6 = i price at + 2" in subsequent periods, and rm i prices above + 2" unless its cost type is less than + 2".
The critical discount factor (I 1)=I is strictly less than c ; and so we now have a lower critical discount factor for supporting the best rigid-pricing equilibrium. We note that (I 1)=I is also the standard critical discount factor for Bertrand supergames with complete information.
Thus, if we are willing to impose the (carrot-stick) belief threat punishment, then incomplete information does not necessitate a higher discount factor in order to support the optimal collusive arrangement (under log-concavity).
While the equilibrium of Proposition 7 entails undominated strategies, one may object that the non-deviating rms might relinquish their worst-case beliefs after a deviation, if the deviant rm consistently did not price at + ": Our speci cation requires a dogged pessimism: even if the deviant rm i hasn't priced at + " yet, each rm j 6 = i remains sure that rm i will do so tomorrow. Standard re nements also do not eliminate this equilibrium. The belief threat punishment as stated, however, is not robust to the possibility of imperfect persistence.
Conclusion
We analyze a dynamic Bertrand game (or equivalently, a series of procurement auctions), in which prices are publicly observed and each rm is privately informed as to its costs. Costs are independent across rms, but each rm's cost exhibits persistence over time. We characterize the set of collusive equilibria, giving particular emphasis to the collusive scheme that is optimal for rms at the start of the game. When costs are perfectly persistent, if the distibution of costs is log concave and rms are su ciently patient, then the optimal collusive scheme entails price rigidity. While it is possible in some circumstances for rms to implement separating equilibria with productive e ciency, these equilibria are not optimal. When costs can take two types and are imperfectly persistent, some productive e ciency is typically optimal. First-best collusion is possible if the rms are su ciently patient relative to the degree of persistence.
With the basic modeling framework now established, a number of exciting extensions may be considered. For example, it would be interesting to examine the model when rms face xed costs and participation in the market is endogenous. A tension might then arise between collusion and predation, with the latter option perhaps having particular appeal to a rm that believes its unit cost is relatively low. Likewise, it would be interesting to include an investment process, whereby rms could endogenously in uence their respective cost distributions. 19 At a methodological level, our analysis is novel in that we characterize optimal cooperation in a dynamic game with persistent, private information. In many applications, agents seek a self-enforcing cooperative relationship, and private information is important and persistent.
The techniques developed here should be useful for such applications.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: Consider the strategies described in the text. We refer to the equilibrium starting with price p w as being in the \war" state. Letṽ cs i ( i;t ; p w ; ) be the discounted pro t to rm i with cost type i;t in period t if the rms are in the war state.
In order to use the same expressions for Models 1 and 2, we use the f ; g notation throughout the proof. For Model 1, we use the notation that
For Model 2, in the work below, we use the convention that i;t = i;t and = 1 > 0 = :
We begin by representing the continuation values in collusive and war states. What is the critical discount factor above which we can satisfy v cs i ( ) = ( ) I(1 ) 2 while also satisfying (7.9)? As (7.8) reveals, when is low, the former may require the selection of a high p w ; however, a high p w may lead to a failure of the latter. We determine the critical discount factor by setting p w = p w and = 1; and then solving (7.7) Finally, given that r > ; a simple comparison of (7.10) and (7.14) reveals that 1 > c > w > 0: Thus, in both models, the o -schedule constraint for the collusion state determines the critical discount factor, and that discount factor is c as de ned in (7.14) . Hence, if c ; we may enforce collusion at r using a carrot-stick punishment scheme, with p w = p w and = .
Proof of Corollary 1: First, we x > c for c given in (7.14) , and observe that the rigid-pricing equilibrium exists, when cost types are su ciently persistent (i.e., as L ! 1 and H ! 0). This follows since c is independent of the degree of persistence.
Second, if cost types are perfectly persistent but there are two possible cost types, then to show that the ex ante optimal PPBE is the best rigid-pricing scheme, we may mimic the proof approach used for Proposition 2, except that we now need to nd the condition analogous to log-concavity for the two-type model. 20 Analogous to the proof of Proposition 2, we consider a relaxed program, whereby we choose R i ( i;1 ) and M i ( i;1 ) to maximize
subject to the following set of constraints:
for each i;1 (pricing constraint); (1 )) (ex ante symmetry constraint);
It is straightforward to show that (IC-down) and (IC-up) imply that M i ( i;1 ) is nonincreasing (market share monotonicity), and given that, (IC-up) must be slack unless
and further R i ( ) = r M i ( ) (if not, R i ( ) could be increased). In turn, it can be shown that (IC-down) must bind. Then, substituting in the (IC-down) constraint, the objective can be
Substituting in the ex ante symmetry constraint, the problem becomes to choose M i ( ) 1=(I (1 )) (where the bound comes from ex ante symmetry and market share monotonicity) to maximize
This expression is linear in M i ( ); and it is increasing in M i ( ) if and only if (r )=( )> 1 F 0 ( ); as desired. Thus, under the parameter restriction, the solution is M i ( ) = M i ( ) = 1=(I(1 )) and R i ( i;1 ) = r M i ( i;1 ); which can be implemented as a PPBE using the best rigid-pricing policy.
Third, de ne the following objects. For the purposes of this proof, we modify our no- 
De ne the present discounted values of market share and revenue given that rm i of type i;1 mimics type^ i;1 throughout the game: where, for all t 1; s j;t = ( j;t ; j;t ; j;t ) = j;t (h t 1 ) for all j 2 f1; ::; Ig; z j;t = (a j;t ; p j;t ; q j;t ) = s j;t ( t (^ i;1 ; i;1 ); j;1 ) for all j 6 = i; z i;t = (a i;t ; p i;t ; q i;t ) = s i;t ( t (^ i;1 ; i;1 );^ i;1 ); and i;t+1 2 T i ( i;t ; s i;t ; z t ):
Let R f R t g 1 t=1 be the extensive-form strategies for the best rigid-pricing scheme. For a given ; let c( ;^ i ) denote the strategy derived from by following the behavior that would assign if the rm had realizations of type^ i in every period. Finally, de ne a strategy n to be individually rational given f n L ; n H g, if, starting from each period t (and given each possible h t and induced beliefs i;t ); each rm i expects average per-period payo s of at least zero from that point on. Since each rm can always guarantee pro ts of 0 by charging a price su ciently high, only individually rational strategies can be used in a PPBE.
Fourth, we need to prove the following claim: for all " > 0; there exists n such that for all n > n ; n i ( ) n i ( R ) < " for all such that is individually rational given f n L ; n H g; and such that n i ( ) n i (c( ;^ i )) for^ i 2 fL; Hg: If this claim is true, we would conclude that for high enough n; the best rigid-pricing policy approximates the payo s that could be attained using the best strategy that is immune to a deviation where a rm pretends to be type L in every period, as well as to all deviations where a rm pretends to be type H in every period.
Clearly, the best strategy that is immune to this limited class of deviations yields pro ts at least as high as the best PPBE strategy.
To establish the claim, we proceed by contradiction. In particular, consider the following hypothesis, which we refer to as the no-convergence hypothesis, or NC: that there exists " > 0; such that for all n , there exists n 0 > n and a corresponding n 0 such that
i (c( n 0 ;^ i )) for^ i 2 fL; Hg: For each n 0 and each^ i;1 ; we can calculate M i (^ i;1 ; n 0 ; f1; 0g) and R i (^ i;1 ; n 0 ; f1; 0g): Since these are real numbers drawn from compact subsets of the real line, there exists a convergent subsequence. Call the limits M i (^ i;1 ) and R i (^ i;1 ); and restrict attention to that subsequence.
We then argue that n 0 i ( n 0 ) converges to
converges to zero. Start by considering the last two terms, which can be rewritten
This converges to zero by de nition of R i ( i;1 ) and M i ( i;1 ).
To show that i ( n 0 ) n 0 i ( n 0 ) converges to zero, recall that i and n 0 i di er at a given strategy pro le only because they place di erent weights on the probability that di erent histories are realized; in particular, i is calculated assuming that costs do not change over time, while n 0 i is calculated assuming transition probabilities f n 0 L ; n 0 H g: Since n 0 is assumed individually rational, following all histories, rm i's expected discounted future payo s must be between 0 and r 1 : For a given ; i ( ) and n 0 i ( ) di er only following a period where some rm experiences a cost change, in which case the di erence between expected payo s from from that point on (computed using f n L ; n H g) is at most 
is an lower bound on the probability that up until period t, no rm experienced a cost change, and (1 ( n 0 L ) I ) is an upper bound on the probability that a cost change occurs in period t,
This bound does not depend on , and so i ( ) n 0 i ( ) converges to zero uniformly as n 0 ! 1 (and n 0 L ! 1): This implies that i ( n 0 )
and Similarly, since
But, we already argued that (7.15 ) and the latter set of requirements on R i and M i , a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 3:
Under the speci ed two-step scheme,
is the market share that a type on [ ; z) expects to receive in all periods after period 2. To satisfy the rst-period on-schedule constraint, p L must satisfy
Note that p L < r, and that p L decreases with ; because the expected market share in periods t > 1 is greater when p L is chosen.
By construction, if c , then the o -schedule constraints are satis ed for periods t > 1: Now consider the o -schedule constraints in period 1. There is no gain to making a deviant announcement, since announcements are uninformative. The most pro table price deviations entail undercutting either p L or r. All possible deviations in quantity restrictions in the rst period are dominated by price deviations: undercutting a price of p L or r guarantees that the rm wins the market, and undercutting r guarantees a positive pro t for all types.
Let us begin by considering the temptation to undercut p L in the rst period. Note that if p L < i;1 , which will hold as approaches 1, then the incentive to undercut p L disappears.
So, this constraint only arises for moderate : On-schedule incentive compatibility tells us that types on [z; ] prefer to use their assigned strategies rather than mimic types below z. Thus, it is su cient to check that all types prefer to follow the behavior assigned to types on [ ; z) rather than undercut p L : The latter constraint can be represented as follows: c , so that the best rigid-pricing scheme is feasible, then (7.16) will be satis ed as well, and the critical discount factor such that (7.16 ) is satis ed is less than c :
Now consider the temptation to undercut the price of r. First consider this temptation for types i;1 2 [ ; z): The o -schedule constraint is more di cult to satisfy as i;1 increases on [ ; z), because in all periods the market share is higher from following the equilibrium strategies than from engaging in the deviation and then switching to the carrot-stick equilibrium. Thus, lower cost types nd the equilibrium strategy relatively more appealing. The rst-period o -schedule constraint that deters this deviation for all i;1 2 [ ; z) is then
where the equality follows by the de nition of M cs (z): Substituting in for p L yields 1 (1 F 0 (z)) The left-hand side is thus strictly greater than the value, L; it achieves when M cs (z) is replaced with 1 I ; likewise, the right-hand side is strictly lower than the value, R; it achieves when M cs (z) is replaced with 1 I : Comparing, we nd that L > R; and so (7.17 ) is satis ed as a strict inequality. Intuitively, the prospect of future market share M cs (z) is enough to deter a deviation in period 2, when the gain in market share from undercutting r is greater than it is in period 1 because some opponent types will choose p L in period 1; thus, the promise of M cs (z) in the future is more than enough to deter a deviation in period 1. which is negative, to establish that the right-hand side of (7.18) is negative. Thus, the critical discount factor such that (7.18) holds is less than c .
Proof of Proposition 4:
We begin by representing beliefs and payo s under the odd-even scheme. Given a t 2 ; rm j's belief about i;t for i 6 = j at the start of period t is given by i;t (a i;t 2 ) = H (1 a i;t 2 ) + L a i;t 2 : Given a t ; rm j's belief about i;t+1 for i 6 = j at the start of period t + 1 is given by i;t+1 (a i;t ) = a i;t : We let v oe i (^ i;t ; i;t ; a t 2 ) be the expected discounted value of payo s for rm i in an odd period t, given a t 2 and at the point where rm i has just observed its cost type i;t ; if it mimics type^ i;t throughout periods t and t + 1; but expects to report truthfully from period t + 2 onwards. This function can be de ned recursively for each rm i, as follows: If this latter constraint holds, then no matter what happened in the odd period (in particular, whether rm i was honest then), rm i does not wish to deviate in the subsequent even period.
We now proceed to construct the scheme described in the proposition. In our constructed odd-even scheme, prices are always equal to r on the equilibrium path. In addition, o i ( t ) = 1=I unless j;t = L and j;t = (H; ::; H) = H for some j: Further, when rm i alone reports low costs, for j 6 = i; o i ( i;t = L; i;t = H) = (I 1) + 1=I; o j ( i;t = L; i;t = H) = 1=I ; We rst show that the constructed odd-even scheme satis es all on-schedule incentive constraints. Reports in odd period t only a ect play in periods t and t + 1 on the equilibrium path.
Further, a su cient condition for the on-schedule constraints to hold is that they hold pointwise in Suppose that i;t has no component equal to L: It is straightforward to check that (7.19 ) is de ned so that (7.21) is exactly binding for rm i when^ i;t = L; i;t = H and i;t = H.
Simple calculations reveal that (r L)(r E i;t+1 [ i;t+1 j i;t = H]) (r H)(r E i;t+1 [ i;t+1 j i;t = L])
where the rst inequality uses r > H and both inequalities use imperfect persistence ( H > 0): Given (7.22) , it is direct to verify that (7.21 and e i (L; i;t ) = 1=I; while e i (H; i;t ) is equal to the right-hand side of (7.20) . Then, it is straightforward to verify that (7.21) holds exactly for this i;t when i;t = H and^ i;t = L. Further, using (7.22) , it is direct to verify that the constraint is slack for this i;t when^ i;t = H and i;t = L: Thus, all on-schedule constraints hold for this scheme.
Next, we represent payo s for the constructed odd-even scheme, and we verify that this scheme improves expected pro ts relative to the best rigid-pricing scheme, wherein all market shares are equal to 1=I and prices equal to r on the equilbrium path. To simplify notation, consider i = 1 and take t odd: First, observe that unless t = (L; H) or t = (H; 1;t ) where 1;t has exactly one component equal to L, all market shares in t and t+1 are equal to 1=I; and there is then no di erence between the constructed odd-even scheme and the best rigid-pricing scheme. If t = (L; H); rm i expects pro ts over the next two periods equal to where the nal term gives the two-period expected pro t under the best rigid-pricing scheme, and the inequality follows from (7.22 Relative to a scheme with all market shares equal to 1=I; the di erence is (r H) + (r H) = 0: Thus, for all t , rm i's expected pro ts over t and t + 1 are sometimes higher and never lower under the constructed odd-even scheme.
Finally, we observe that the o -schedule constraints hold with slack when > c and all market shares are equal to 1=I; by the equivalence of the best rigid-price scheme and the oddeven scheme in that case. Since equilibrium payo s in the odd-even scheme are continuous in market shares, if > c ; then for > 0 small enough, the o -schedule constraints will be satis ed in the odd-even scheme with partial pooling as well.
Proof of Proposition 7:
We established above that the carrot-stick belief threat punishment does not entail the use of weakly dominated strategies. Let ( i;1 ) be the present discounted value a deviant rm expects in the carrot-stick belief threat punishment. Rewriting, we obtain
